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Introduction
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Luxem-
bourg), although one of the smallest coun-
tries in the world, has historically played a
disproportionate role in the formation of mod-
ern Europe. It was a charter member of the
Benelux Economic Union, the European Union,
NATO, and the United Nations. The territory
now called Luxembourg was a prized possession
of various powers in Europe because of its geog-
raphy and natural resources, only gaining its
independence in 1890; with a population of
480,000 (2007), it boasts the world’s highest GDP
per capita of $87,995. (The World Factbook . . .)
Although insignificant in size and area, Luxem-
bourg has been able to maintain its economic
and strategic importance on the European stage. 
The purpose of this article is to examine
how Luxembourg ultimately became the cor-
nerstone of the world’s largest steel conglomer-
ate. In what follows I will provide a short his-
tory of the steel industry in Luxembourg along
with a description of the evolution of the coun-
try’s steel corporations into what is today
ArcelorMittal.
The History of Steel in 
Luxembourg
Although there is evidence of ironworking
in Gallo-Roman times circa 500 A.D. (Edwards,
p. 1), for all intents and purposes the steel indus-
try’s rich history in Luxembourg took shape
in the late nineteenth century. Following the
inventions of two British industrialists, Henry
Bessemer and Sidney Gilchrist Thomas in 1855
and 1875 respectively, mass production of
steel became feasible. The Bessemer process,
developed in Sheffield, England, utilized the
patented Bessemer converter in order to mass-
produce steel from pig-iron by removing impu-
rities using compressed air which was bubbled
through the molten metal. However, the
minette1 deposits in southern Luxembourg
remained untapped by the Bessemer process due
to their high phosphorus content until the
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1Minette sediment in the Esch and Differdange
(southwestern regions of Luxembourg) was typically com-
prised of 30 percent iron ore and large concentrations of
phosphorus, making it difficult to produce steel using the
original Bessemer process.
Thomas-Gilchrist2 process was developed. These
innovations led to the tremendous growth of the
global steel industry in the late nineteenth
and (as shown in Figure 1) twentieth centuries,
measured by compound aggregate growth rates
(CAGR).
The population in Luxembourg grew from
211,088 in 1890 to 259,891 in 1910 and became
more highly concentrated in the City of Luxem-
bourg and the Canton of Esch; the mining
and steel area employed 45 percent of the total
population before the First World War as com-
pared with only 26 percent in 1880. (“Economic
and Social . . . ,” p. 7) Located adjacent to the
iron- and coal-rich terrain of the Lorraine
region, Luxembourg was the ideal place to
develop steel production. Following its acces-
sion into the Zollverein3, Germany provided
Luxembourg with both much needed invest-
ment funds and a primary outlet for its steel
products. 
Arcelor’s historic lineage may be traced
back to its origins with the Forges d’Eich-Le
Gallais and Metz et Cie in 1838 (see Table 1). The
growth of the Luxembourg steel industry, over
170 years in the making, has been a story of
growth and decline, merger and acquisition,
reaching its zenith in 2006 with the merger of
Arcelor and Mittal Steel. The same tumul-
tuous existence is echoed in France and Spain
whose steel companies, also included in Table
1, combined with Arbed much later to form
Arcelor. 
In the years immediately preceding the
First World War, the steel industry in Luxem-
bourg went through its first phase of eco-
nomic consolidation with the merger of
Fourneaux, Sarrebuck, and d’Eich companies
into Arbed in 1911. Arbed became one of the
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Figure 1
Global Crude Steel Production
Source: Chaudhary, p. 3.
2The key to phosphorus removal in the Bessemer con-
verter was the use of a lining composed of a strong basic sub-
stance (such as burned limestone) with which the phos-
phorus could combine and be eliminated in slag. With the
aid of his cousin, Percy Gilchrist, Thomas was able to
experiment and perfect his product in 1875. (“Thomas,
Sidney . . .”)
3The German customs union was established by the
majority of German states in 1834 to eliminate internal cus-
toms barriers while upholding protectionist tariff regimes
against external parties. Luxembourg joined in 
1842 and benefited from the economic ties until 1918 when
the Allied powers required that Luxembourg dissolve its 
affiliation.
first truly vertically integrated steel companies,
controlling ore, coke, and rolling mills. By 1913
Luxembourg was producing more than one mil-
lion metric tons of steel annually, of which
nearly 70 percent went directly to Germany.
(“Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 8)
Following WWI the Allies mandated that
Luxembourg withdraw from the Zollverein; and,
in the absence of German investment, the
steel industry in the region fell upon hard times.
The inter-war period was categorized by slug-
gish growth in the global economy, further
compounding the region’s economic and social
hardship. Table 1 illustrates how this confluence
of events impacted steel production. The effects
cascaded through to the steel industry where
annual output grew at a compound aggregate
growth rate of only 2 percent and consequently
led to social and economic unrest during the
period.
The industry’s fortunes in Luxembourg
were revived briefly during the Second World
War as a dramatic increase in production was
required in support of Germany’s war effort fol-
lowing the occupation that began in 1940.
This increase was short-lived, however, as the
Allied invasion and bombing campaigns deci-
mated the German military machine in the later
days of the war. Fortunately for Luxembourg’s
economy, the restrictions of the post-war con-
struction period following World War I were not
repeated; and efforts such as the Marshall Plan
led to a significant investment of $559 million
in the country and a rapid recovery. (Bailey, 
p. 205) The period following the war from
1945 until 1975 saw annual steel production
in Luxembourg grow from less than one million
to over six million metric tons. This dramatic
increase in production was at least in part due
to the rapid growth in technical productivity4 as
measured by the Federation of Luxembourg
Steel Industries. Steelmaking productivity more
than doubled in conjunction with the rapid 
general post-war growth from 1950 to 1974.
(“Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 12)
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Table 1
ArcelorMittal Merger Timeline
4Measured in tons per annum per worker and reflecting
increases in efficiency and new methods of producing steel.
The marked growth in both raw produc-
tion and productivity during the aforemen-
tioned period reversed course from 1975–1985
as the world reeled from the first and second oil
crises. The steel industry in particular suf-
fered from a serious worldwide demand and sup-
ply imbalance as severe overproduction placed
downward pressure on prices. Beginning in
1975, Luxembourg responded rapidly to the eco-
nomic downturn in an effort to stem any poten-
tial job losses. Table 2 identifies the cumula-
tive expenditures made under the “steel plan”5
including investment aid, financial restructur-
ing, and social support. The most significant aid
package prioritized several new social programs
including legislation with the express purpose
of providing for early retirement of steel work-
ers. Despite the injection of the equivalent of
one billion euros, stemming the increase in
unemployment was impossible; and the num-
ber of registered unemployed increased
markedly from 1974 to 1984 as more than
14,800 steelworkers left the industry. (“Eco-
nomic and Social . . . ,” p. 14)
This period of economic rationalization
continued on a larger scale across all of Luxem-
bourg’s steelmakers. Ultimately, in the late
1970s Arbed was the sole surviving steelmaker
due primarily to the direct intervention of the
state. The Societe Nationale de Credit et d’In-
vestissement,6 a long-time national steel indus-
try investor, increased its holdings to 42.9
percent of Arbed’s total capital in order to
stave off the company’s bankruptcy. The magni-
tude of the government intervention underlines
the relative importance of the industry as Lux-
embourg’s principal employer.
A National and Regional Champion 
in the EU
Luxembourg’s rationale in maintaining a
partnership between government and private
enterprise can be described by the doctrine of
economic nationalism.7 It follows that in smaller
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Table 2
Luxembourg Steel Plan Expenditures
Budgetary Expenditures Made by the State under the “Steel Plan” between 1975 and 1987
Unit: million euros 1975–1982 1983–1987 1975–1987
A. Investment Aid
(Ordinary capital subsidies, extraordinary capital subsidies,
special interest rate reductions, and other subsidies) 70.6 63.4 134.0
B. Financial Restructuring 
(Convertible bond and share subscriptions, acquisition of
Sidmar company shares, special and temporary aid) – 393.0 393.0
C. Social Aid 
(Professional re-training, re-employment benefits, early
retirement, and special disability scheme) 147.1 307.6 454.7
D. Tariff Aid 9.6 1.7 11.3
Total 227.3 765.7 993.0
Source: “Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 14.
5The “steel plan” was a series of emergency measures
enacted between 1975 and 1987 in an effort to rejuvenate
the ailing Luxembourg steel industry and support social
services for affected workers.
6Founded in 1978 as a federal organization, the Soci-
ete Nationale de Credit et d’Investissement provides financ-
ing through grants, loans, credit facilities, and equity invest-
ments in public and private companies located in
Luxembourg. 
7Economic nationalism refers to policies that are
guided by the idea of protecting domestic consumption,
labor, and business.
states the theory seems to hold particular appeal
because they are more conscious of losing their
own sovereignty and thereby justify the eco-
nomic protection and investment in “critical”
industries that provide some economic inde-
pendence. Arbed engendered a great deal of his-
torical pride, and the political and socioeco-
nomic interests of the nation were and still
are intertwined with Luxembourg’s single
largest company and employer. (More than 60
percent of the industrial workforce was tied to
steelmaking prior to WWI.)
Realizing its vulnerability, Luxembourg
began to increase its economic diversity by pro-
moting a service economy during the 1950s.
Indeed, this vision and flexibility enabled the
country to successfully adapt to the changing
economic landscape and turned it into a lead-
ing European service provider. Yet, in the early
1970s, twenty years following this shift in eco-
nomic focus, the steel industry still accounted
for more than 20 percent of the total added
value of Luxembourg according to STATEC.8
However, there was a dramatic decline in the
steel sector following the oil crisis in 1973. 
The exhaustion of minette ore deposits saw
the last Luxembourg iron mine close in 1981.
Nevertheless, Arbed remained the country’s
largest employer. Due to the company’s national
champion status, the economic and political
support of the government provided the
resources necessary for modernization of the
industry. These efforts paid off in the form of
new technologies, such as the electric arc fur-
nace, dramatic productivity gains, and quality
improvements between 1974 and 1990. 
The importance of national sovereignty and
economic independence in a rapidly globaliz-
ing world has led to support for the steel indus-
try in many countries. However, such national
interests have distorted market supply and
demand, contributing to chronic overcapacity in
the global steel industry and volatile and unsus-
tainable markets. Whereas traditional economic
theory suggests that market forces would move
to resolve any imbalances by lowering produc-
tion and eventually capacity in an economic
downturn, many nations preserve production in
an effort to protect jobs, economic stability,
and their strategic independence. Excess
national production is thus exported at subsi-
dized prices, flooding neighboring markets. 
Consolidation Trends
The long-term viability of the steel indus-
try broadly defined requires significant ration-
alization in order to remedy the challenges of
rampant overcapacity, global competitiveness,
and increasing commodity prices. In response,
toward the end of the 1990s, following the Asian
Crisis (1997) and early into the twenty-first cen-
tury, the market reacted with a wave of regional
consolidations. In order to survive, Arbed was
driven to become a pan-European champion by
merging with French steelmaker Usinor and
Spanish concern Aceralia in 2002. The merger
created the largest steelmaker in the world, with
110,000 employees and annual steel production
of 46 million tons. The pressure for further con-
solidation is evidenced by the most recent wave
of mergers and acquisitions in the twenty-first
century that created global companies from
regional leaders, ArcelorMittal being the most
notable example in the steel industry. 
Steel companies have been caught
between raw material price inflation, increasing
demand, particularly from China, and the con-
solidation of customers, particularly the auto-
mobile sector. In a historically fragmented
industry facing fluctuating economic condi-
tions, stability has been hard to maintain; con-
sequently managing costs has been one of the
most important issues for steelmakers. Yet,
competitiveness in the steel industry requires
significant capital expenditures in technology
and heavy equipment. Balancing these forces
had made companies like Arcelor and Mittal suc-
cessful while other companies, such as Beth-
lehem Steel in the United States, doomed them-
selves to failure as overproduction and capacity
issues forced them out of business. The inten-
sive capital investment required in order to
compete in the steel market requires continu-
ous innovation leveraged over increasing
economies of scale. A dominant leader(s) needed
to emerge to stabilize the industry and drive
more effective management of material effi-
ciency and innovation across the sector.
37
8The Central Service for Statistics and Economic
Studies, formed in 1962 from the merger between the Gen-
eral Statistics Office and the Service for Economic Studies
and Documentation in Luxembourg, provides economic data
to the government.
The industry has incentives to consolidate
from both ends of the supply chain. The market
for raw materials is controlled by oligopolies.
The top five coking coal suppliers and the top
three iron ore suppliers in Figure 2 control
upwards of 50 percent of their respective mar-
ket shares. In the face of accelerating demand,
they have been able to increase prices dramat-
ically since 2004. The Chinese have been one
of the most vociferous in objecting to this
concentration of pricing power and have even
entered into the acquisition fight to protect
their interests, purchasing a minority stake in
Rio Tinto. (“China Takes . . .”) In order to main-
tain negotiating leverage, steel companies must
consolidate their buying power on a global base
or risk having their margins squeezed by sup-
plier consolidation.
The top five manufacturers by tonnage
in the global steel industry (shown in Table 3)
account for less than 20 percent of market
share. (By comparison the number is closer to
70 percent for automobiles.) The benefits of con-
solidation include the ability to maintain greater
pricing power, a serious problem in the past due
to the multiplicity of national protectionist
interests. Additionally, as customers themselves
become more globally distributed, their steel
needs can be better served by a company with
a presence and capability in each customer
locale. Finally, the trend of moving produc-
tion to low-cost and high-growth countries can
be most effectively navigated by global players
in the industry.
Consolidation in the steel industry also
allows firms to capture growth opportunities in
new markets. Facilitating new relationships in
geographically dispersed regions will come
more easily to a diversified steel company with
a global network already in place. Additionally,
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Figure 2
Supplier Consolidation and Raw Material Inflation
Source: Chaudhary, p. 5.
major players will have access to the requisite
investment capital to pour into new opportu-
nities while spreading the risk across their
entire portfolios. Finally, global companies
will be less subject to the influence of national
interests and therefore will be better prepared
to handle fluctuations in demand and prices
by adjusting production and employment.
The ArcelorMittal Case
One of the most dramatic consolidation
events in the steel industry occurred in 2006
when Mittal Steel, controlled by Indian born
Lakshmi Mittal, launched a hostile bid for
Luxembourg-based Arcelor. It was a new breed
of deal that created the first truly global steel
company in terms of geographic reach, port-
folio of clients, and wide selection of value-added
products. Driven primarily by opportunities of
potential synergy, market power, and global
competitiveness, Mittal launched an initial bid
for the company at the beginning of January
2006, valuing the company at 1˛8.6 billion.
What followed was a bitter five months of nego-
tiations that ultimately succeeded in creating
a behemoth controlling 10 percent of the
world’s production (three times as much as its
closest rival). In the following sections, the
financial and economic motivations supporting
Mittal’s rationale will be compared with extra-
neous political and socioeconomic perspectives. 
Historically, the projected economic ben-
efits of large merger and acquisition transac-
tions have come under fire from various con-
stituencies, including labor unions, investment
analysts, and the investing public, for failing
to deliver the promised financial results. No
matter how one evaluates the success of a
merger, it is difficult to quantify non-financial
factors. These factors can play significant but
different roles with individual parties. As a
result, there is an inherent tension between
purely financial and the non-financial per-
spectives, with neither telling the entire story.
Mittal’s actions and statements suggest that
its primary motivation in approaching Arcelor
was financial. However, in the case of Arcelor,
non-financial factors had considerably greater
importance. 
Mittal’s Perspective
For Lakshmi Mittal and his son Aditya, the
merger of two industry titans made economic
sense. The deal was heralded by Mittal’s man-
agement for several reasons, including poten-
tial resource, manufacturing, and research syn-
ergies, portfolio optimization, and international
expansion opportunities. According to Aditya
Mittal, “The merger is good for jobs and invest-
ment as it creates a more sustainable industry.”
(as quoted in Aldrick, “Arcelor Bid . . . ,” p. 1)
Historically, companies have struggled in peri-
ods of economic turbulence because of compet-
ing interests and market fragmentation. As a
global entity, ArcelorMittal should now have the
ability to control costs more effectively and
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Table 3
The Top Six Steelmakers by Tonnage
*mmt = million metric tons.
Source: “World Steel in Figures 2007,” p. 3.
Rank Company Production (mmt)*
1 ArcelorMittal 117.2
2 Nippon Steel 34.7
3 JFE 32
4 POSCO 30.1
5 Baosteel 22.5
6 U.S. Steel 21.2
improve margins by capitalizing on economies
of scale, ultimately diversifying its business
operations. The two companies complemented
one another in terms of geographic operational
scope. Both had been products of numerous
mergers, and their combination, according to
Aditya Mittal, would deliver ˛1.6 billion in
savings.
Research and development synergies can
create a significant amount of value and com-
petitive advantage. According to Aditya Mittal,
the effect of research investments combined
between the two companies “will be leveraged
over 130 (million) tons. Others will be able to
manage just 30 (million) tons per dollar.” (as
quoted in Aldrick, “Arcelor Bid . . . ,” p. 2) Main-
taining innovation in steel product lines is inte-
gral to the product’s continued applications
around the world. ArcelorMittal’s ability to con-
centrate research in fewer locations while shar-
ing the outcomes globally will spread the risk
and ultimately provide the promised economies
of scale.
The bid for Arcelor enhanced Mittal’s
reputation, expanding the company’s reach into
the heart of Europe while it concurrently re-
branded Mittal from a low-cost commodity
steelmaker into a world class environmen-
tally-friendly company with cutting-edge tech-
nology and product development. With its
increased size, the company should be able to
stand toe-to-toe with major suppliers and cus-
tomers in order to protect its bottom line.
Arcelor and the European Perspective
Politically, Luxembourg’s government was
presented with a difficult situation by the pro-
posed merger. Although the merger made eco-
nomic sense, there were other factors to be con-
sidered. In particular, the historical significance
of the steel industry to Luxembourg’s econ-
omy meant that the loss of such an icon could
be a political disaster for Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker. On the other hand, Luxem-
bourg’s reputation carefully cultivated by the
government, portraying the country as an
ideal place to locate international business head-
quarters, would be severely tarnished if it
attempted to block the transaction. India has
a great sense of pride in the success of Mittal
Steel, so much so that India’s commerce min-
ister, Kamal Nath, hinted that a “move against
Mittal Steel could trigger a trade war between
the two countries.” (Thornton, p. 1)
Stoking national sentiment and a populist
agenda was an ingenious tactic that achieved
several political objectives as well as financial
benefit for Luxembourg. It placated the elec-
torate by playing to European emotions, secured
several important concessions, and ultimately
provided the government with a foreign scape-
goat in case of the failure of the steel industry
in Luxembourg. Last but not least, the tactics
employed contributed to a higher value for all
shareholders. 
The first response to Mittal’s announce-
ment of its intention to merge was grounded
in the economic nationalism argument. Former
Usinor President and Arcelor Chief Executive
Guy Dollé likened Arcelor to the “Airbus of
the European Steel industry” in an attempt to
engender a sense of European pride. (Maidment,
p. 1) Subsequently, the governments of France
and Luxembourg moved quickly to dismiss
the merger proposal, and Dollé continued to
voice his opinion regarding the ArcelorMittal
deal in a way that at times verged on xenopho-
bia. He questioned Mittal’s safety record and
compared its products to “cheap cologne”
against Arcelor’s high quality “perfume.” He
even went so far as to call Mittal’s cash “mon-
naie de singe” or “monkey money.” These out-
landish comments merely demonstrated an
emotional rather than a rational reaction to the
merger.
Initially, both Arcelor management and
European political forces were sharply opposed
to the deal, and in general Europeans felt as
though their national pride was for sale in a
takeover orchestrated by an individual from a
“third world country.” There have been exam-
ples of economic nationalism effectively block-
ing other acquisition attempts including
Danone9 in France and CNOOC-Unocal10 in
the United States.
The strategy of the Luxembourg govern-
ment and Arcelor management successfully gar-
nered several important concessions. First, Lux-
embourg was established as the new company’s
global headquarters. Although the true corpo-
rate power remains in London where the Mittal
family resides, this was an important gesture
both from a symbolic and an economic stand-
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point. The decision to move the headquarters of
the combined company to Luxembourg placated
Luxembourgers and Europeans. The move
also maintained important higher-level employ-
ment opportunities in the country for the fore-
seeable future. Secondly, as the chief share-
holder with 5.6 percent of Arcelor’s shares,
the government of Luxembourg had a finan-
cial stake in the deal. (“Forging a Steel . . .”)
Politicians and management grumbled that the
initial offer of 1˛8.6 billion from Mittal valued
the company below what it was worth. The
negotiations dragged on over several months
until Mittal increased its offer by more than
33 percent to 2˛6.5 billion and conceded several
places on the management board for Luxem-
bourg officials. Thus, Luxembourg’s ferocious
resistance resulted in a much-enhanced deal for
shareholders. 
Labor’s Perspective
In order for the merger to proceed, Mittal
also needed to placate apprehensive labor con-
stituencies in the government in labor unions.
These constituencies had reason to be concerned
for, as Aldrick notes (p. 2), “the global steel work-
force has declined 30 percent every ten years
since the 1970s” and as many as 1,500,000 jobs
have been lost. Therefore, the governments of
Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and Spain were
acutely aware of the political and socioeconomic
impact of potential job losses and had a vested
interest in the merger’s outcome. For Luxem-
bourg, Arcelor represented the single largest
national employer. Belgium, and in particular
Wallonia, whose industrial heritage had fallen
on hard times, employed over 12,000 steelwork-
ers. Although France didn’t have an equity stake,
approximately 30 percent of the employees of
Arcelor worked in that country; further, Spain’s
18 Arcelor plants were also at risk.
Prior to announcing the merger, Mittal
had previously acknowledged that it was
attempting to eliminate 40,000 jobs internally.
Continental diplomats and management were
justifiably concerned that if any deal were
struck, ongoing restructuring at Mittal would
overflow into Arcelor. However, after repeated
efforts at shuttle diplomacy plus several prom-
ises from Mittal to protect European jobs, Mit-
tal was able to navigate much of the political
opposition. Ultimately, the success of the merger
will be judged by labor unions and by govern-
ments to the extent that ArcelorMittal maintains
its European operations. 
Arcelor Management Reaction
Although Arcelor CEO Guy Dollé attempted
to leverage political and social forces to aid in
the defense of Arcelor against the merger, his
efforts were hampered by poor management.
Arcelor did not mount an effective defense
due to several tactical errors. Significant
amounts of surplus cash made the company
an ideal target for acquisition in an industry
under pressure to consolidate. Additionally,
management had tenuous control over its own
destiny because of the significant share-dilution
or free float11 that resulted in 86 percent of
shares being held by anonymous owners. Mittal
simply had to accumulate shares on the open
market and could do so to a certain degree with-
out Arcelor management’s knowledge. 
In a final unsuccesful attempt to hold Mit-
tal at bay, Arcelor management proposed two
strategic options including a massive share
repurchase program in order to return cash to
shareholders and the acquisition of Severstal,
a Russian Steel company valued at 1˛3 billion.
Ultimately, however, the shareholders were
appeased by the sweetened offer of Mittal worth
2˛6.5 billion or 4˛0.37 a share.
Conclusion
Steel has played a central role in the eco-
nomic history of the Grand Duchy, and it tells a
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9Danone is a food-product company based in Paris,
France, that operates as Dannon in the United States. The
company provides a variety of dairy products, bottled water,
and baby foods. In 2005, speculation of a takeover bid by
PepsiCo. led to the legislative intervention of the French
government blocking the sale of strategic businesses.
10The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation
dropped its all-cash bid of $18.5 billon for Unocal in 2005 as
a result of a broad political backlash in the United States
centered around national security concerns.
11Free float represents the proportion of a quoted
company’s shares not held by the company or close affiliates
(e.g., directors, founding families), allowing prospective suit-
ors to acquire control of the company without management
knowledge. 
compelling story of Luxembourg’s ability to
grow from an industrial nation into a premier
international financial hub. For its size, Luxem-
bourg is one of the most influential and afflu-
ent countries in the European Union. Though
the Luxembourg steel industry may have waned
somewhat and has been supplanted by a service
economy, the most recent merger reaffirms the
nation’s prominence and its ability to remain an
economic force in this sector. 
Mittal has turned the traditional paradigm
of outward FDI from Europe and the West on its
head: growing the Mittal outfit from its hum-
ble beginnings while acquiring assets around the
globe culminating in the merger of Europe’s
steel champion. ArcelorMittal has certainly set
the pace for an industry that Mittal envisions
as being controlled by several global steel com-
panies each with production of more than 100
million metric tons annually. The fusion of
Mittal and Arcelor represents a significant
milestone toward the global consolidation of the
steel industry in which Luxembourg continues
to play a meaningful role. Termed a merger of
equals, between young and old, their operations
were complementary, sharing a common foun-
dation of growth by merger and acquisition in
disparate regions of the world. Their consum-
mation stands upon proven experience and helps
to explain why ArcelorMittal may well succeed
where numerous other mergers have failed. 
Time has tested Luxembourg’s mettle,
necessitating leadership and dynamic trans-
formation. Many challenges are yet to come;
while ArcelorMittal dominates the steel indus-
try now, its position is far from secure. China
has shown through its rapid ascendancy to be
an economic leviathan and a tremendous mar-
ket for Mittal. Yet the emergence of China as a
steel exporter will surely challenge Mittal’s dom-
inance. In addition to the emergence of China,
the company’s acquisition-focused growth strat-
egy may be a cause for concern, sapping capi-
tal and management time from the core busi-
nesses. One thing is for certain, however; if both
Luxembourg and ArcelorMittal are to remain
competitive, constant innovation will be
required.
42
Aldrick, Philip. “Arcelor Bid Will Strengthen Europe’s Steel
Industry, Says Mittal.” The London Telegraph. Feb-
ruary 28, 2006. Online. www.telegraph.co.uk/money/
main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/02/28/cnwmittal28.
xml. Accessed January 5, 2008. 
Aldrick, Philip. “Steel Chief on His Mettle to Fight off
Mittal.” The London Telegraph. March 4, 2006.
www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/
2006/03/04/ccsteel04.xml. Accessed March 17, 2008.
“Arbed S.A.” Online. www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/ARBED-SA-Company-History.html.
Accessed March 20, 2008.
“Arcelor Annual Report 2006.” Online. www.arcelormittal.
com/index.php?lang=1&page=600. Accessed March
13, 2008.
Bailey, Thomas A. The Marshall Plan Summer. Online.
books.google.com/books?hl=en&id=KByPwUfN_
D8C&dq=the+marshall+plan+summer&printsec=
frontcover&source=web&ots=WokGHGfyG3&sig
=se6EOw6ujVz49KfC1u6R9dkmNgs#PPP1,M1.
Accessed March 16, 2008.
Chaudhary, Chanakya. “Effects of Consolidation on the
Global Steel Market: Implications of Cross Border
M&A and Intra-company Trade.” Presentation on
March 18, 2007. Online. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
51/57/38680802.pdf. Accessed March 18, 2008.
“China Takes a Stake in Rio Tinto.” BBC News: Business.
February 1, 2008. Online. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/7221710.stm. Accessed February 1, 2008.
Eckel, Edwin. Iron Ores, Their Occurrence, Valuation and
Control. Online. books.google.com/books?id=
bocNAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Iron+
Ores,+Their+Occurrence,+Valuation+and+Control.
Accessed March 12, 2008.
Edwards, K.C. “Historical Geography of the Luxembourg
Iron and Steel Industry: Presidential Address.” Trans-
actions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers),
No. 29, 1961, pp. 1–16.
“Economic and Social Portrait of Luxembourg.” STATEC
(Service Central de la Statistique et es Etudes
Economiques). Online. www.portrait.public.lu/en/
index.html. Accessed March 17, 2008. 
“The European War.” The New York Times Current History.
Vol. 17, 1919. Online. books.google.com/books?hl
=en&id=m9wLAAAAYAAJ&dq=The+New+York+
Times+Current+History&printsec=frontcover&source
=web&ots=R44YGwFG33&sig=OFRBiQ0EmLai1tT4t
7wImTHu_68#PPP8,M1. Accessed March 17, 2008. 
“Forging a Steel Giant: Mittal’s Bid for Arcelor.” Online.
www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=view
feature&language=english&id=1112. Accessed March
29, 2008. 
Geroski, Paul. “Competition Policy and National Champi-
ons.” Remarks at the Austrian Institute of Economic
Research. March 8, 2005. Online. www.competition-
commission.org.uk/our_peop/members/chair_speeches/
pdf/geroski_wifo_vienna_080305.pdf. Accessed March
13, 2008.
Greenberg, Danna and P.J. Guinan. “Mergers and Acquisi-
tions in Knowledge Enterprises.” Babson Insight.
March 19, 2008. Online. www.babsoninsight.com/
contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/631. Accessed March
29, 2008. 
“Luxembourg: Independent Luxembourg.” Encyclopædia
Britannica Online. Online. www.britannica.com/eb/
article-9108474/Luxembourg. Accessed March 16,
2008.
Maidment, Paul. “Mittal Sees beyond Arcelor.” Forbes Mag-
azine. January 31, 2006. Online. www.forbes.com/
2006/01/31/mittal-arcelor-mergers_cx_pm_
0131mittal_print.html. Accessed March 17, 2008.
“Mittalic Magic.” The Economist. February 14, 2008. Online.
www.economist.com/people/displaystory.cfm?story_
id=10688840. March 28, 2008.
“Mittal Set to Cut Bid If Arcelor Lifts Payout.” The Inter-
national Herald Tribune. March 30, 2006. Online.
www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/29/business/steel.php.
Accessed March 20, 2008.
“Thomas, Sidney Gilchrist.” Encyclopædia Britannica
Online. Online. search.eb.com/eb/article-9072175.
Accessed March 17, 2008.
Thornton, Philip. “Mandelson and India Warn the French
over Mittal.” The London Independent. February 2,
2006. Online. findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/
is_20060202/ai_n16055867. Accessed March 17,
2008.
“Who Is Arcelor’s White Knight?” The London Telegraph.
May 25, 2006. Online. www.telegraph.co.uk/money/
main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/05/26/umitt126.
xml&sSheet=/money/2006/05/26/ixcitytop.html.
Accessed March 17, 2008.
The World Factbook: Luxembourg. Online. www.cia.gov.
Accessed March 30, 2008.
“World Steel in Figures 2007.” International Iron and
Steel Institute. Online. www.worldsteel.org/pictures/
publicationfiles/WSIF06%20Final.pdf. Accessed Feb-
ruary 25, 2008.
43
REFERENCES
